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We present a controlled secure direct communication protocol by using
Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) entangled state via swapping quantum entan-
glement and local unitary operations. Since messages transferred only by using local
operations and a public channel after entangled states are successfully distributed,
this protocol can protect the communication against a destroying-travel-qubit-type
attack. This scheme can also be generalized to a multi-party control system.
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The quantum key distribution (QKD) is an ingenious application of quantum mechanics,
in which two remote legitimate users (Alice and Bob) establish a shared secret key through
the transmission of quantum signals. Since the pioneering work of Bennett and Brassard
was published in 1984 [1], different quantum key distribution protocols have been presented
[2, 3, 4, 5, 6]. Different from the key distribution protocol, some quantum secure direct
communication (QSDC) protocols, which permit important messages to be communicated
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2directly without first establishing a random key to encrypt them, have been shown recently
[7, 8, 9, 10].
Beige et al. [2] have proposed that messages can be read out only after the transmission
of an additional piece of classical information for each qubit. Deng et al. [8] have proposed
a two-step quantum direct communication protocol using Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR)
pair. It was shown to be probably secure. Nguyen [9] has proposed an entanglement-
based protocol for two people to simultaneously exchange their messages. However, in
all these secure direct communication schemes, it is necessary to send the qubits carrying
secret messages in a public channel. Therefore, Eve (eavesdropper) can attack the qubits in
transmission.
Very recently, Man et al. [10] have proposed a new deterministic secure direct communi-
cation protocol by using swapping quantum entanglement [11, 12, 13, 14] and local unitary
operations. This communication protocol can be used to transmit securely either a secret
key or a plain text messages. In this paper, we present a controlled secure direct communi-
cation by using GHZ entangled state via swapping quantum entanglement and local unitary
operations. We show that the communication is secure under some eavesdropping attacks
[15, 16] and that two users can transmit their secret messages securely.
Let us first describe the quantum entanglement swapping simply. Let |0〉 and |1〉 be the
horizontal and the vertical polarization states of a photon, respectively. Then, the four Bell
states |ψ±〉 = (|01〉 ± |10〉)/√2 and |φ±〉 = (|00〉 ± |11〉)/√2 are maximally entangled states
in the two-photon Hilbert space. Let the initial state of two-photon pairs be the product of
any two of the four Bell states, such as |ψ+12〉 and |ψ+34〉. Then, after Bell measurements on
the photons 1 and 3 pair and the photons 2 and 4 pair, since the equations
|ψ+12〉 ⊗ |ψ+34〉 =
1
2
(|ψ+13〉|ψ+24〉 − |ψ−13〉|ψ−24〉+ |φ+13〉|φ+24〉 − |φ−13〉|φ−24〉), (1)
|ψ+12〉 ⊗ |ψ−34〉 =
1
2
(|ψ+13〉|ψ−24〉 − |ψ−13〉|ψ+24〉 − |φ+13〉|φ−24〉+ |φ−13〉|φ+24〉), (2)
|ψ+12〉 ⊗ |φ+34〉 =
1
2
(|ψ+13〉|φ+24〉 − |ψ−13〉|φ−24〉+ |φ+13〉|ψ+24〉 − |φ−13〉|ψ−24〉), (3)
|ψ+12〉 ⊗ |φ−34〉 =
1
2
(|ψ+13〉|φ−24〉 − |ψ−13〉|φ+24〉 − |φ+13〉|ψ−24〉+ |φ−13〉|ψ+24〉), (4)
obviously hold, one can see that there is an explicit correspondence between a known initial
state of two qubit pairs and its swapped measurement outcomes. In addition, it is easily
3verified that the four Bell states can be transformed into each other by some unitary op-
erations. Then, encodings of secret messages can be imposed on the Bell states by using
the local unitary operations, i.e., Iˆ|ψ+34〉 = |ψ+34〉, σˆx|ψ+34〉 = |φ+34〉, −iσˆy|ψ+34〉 = |φ−34〉, and
σˆz|ψ+34〉 = |ψ−34〉. We assume that each of the above four unitary operations corresponds to a
two-bit encoding, i.e., Iˆ to 00, σˆx to 01, −iσˆy to 10, and σˆz to 11. Taking advantage of the
quantum entanglement swapping and the assumption of the two-bit codings, we can propose
a controlled secure direct communication by GHZ entangled state protocol.
Let us turn to depicting our controlled secure direct communication protocol. First, we
write the eight GHZ entangled state basis in two different bases as follows:
|ψ1〉 = 1√
2
(|000〉+ |111〉)htc
=
1
2
[|+〉h(|+〉t|+〉c + |−〉t|−〉c) + |−〉h(|+〉t|−〉c + |−〉t|+〉c)], (5)
|ψ2〉 = 1√
2
(|000〉 − |111〉)htc
=
1
2
[|+〉h(|−〉t|+〉c + |+〉t|−〉c) + |−〉h(|+〉t|+〉c + |−〉t|−〉c)], (6)
|ψ3〉 = 1√
2
(|100〉+ |001〉)htc
=
1
2
[|+〉h(|+〉t|+〉c + |−〉t|+〉c)− |−〉h(|+〉t|−〉c + |−〉t|−〉c)], (7)
|ψ4〉 = 1√
2
(|100〉 − |001〉)htc
=
1
2
[|+〉h(|+〉t|−〉c + |−〉t|−〉c)− |−〉h(|+〉t|+〉c + |−〉t|+〉c)], (8)
|ψ5〉 = 1√
2
(|010〉+ |101〉)htc
=
1
2
[|+〉h(|+〉t|+〉c − |−〉t|−〉c) + |−〉h(|+〉t|−〉c − |−〉t|+〉c)], (9)
|ψ6〉 = 1√
2
(|010〉 − |101〉)htc
4=
1
2
[|+〉h(|+〉t|−〉c − |−〉t|+〉c) + |−〉h(|+〉t|+〉c − |−〉t|−〉c)], (10)
|ψ7〉 = 1√
2
(|110〉+ |001〉)htc
=
1
2
[|+〉h(|+〉t|+〉c − |−〉t|−〉c) + |−〉h(|−〉t|+〉c − |+〉t|−〉c)], (11)
|ψ8〉 = 1√
2
(|110〉 − |001〉)htc
=
1
2
[|+〉h(|+〉t|−〉c − |−〉t|+〉c) + |−〉h(|−〉t|−〉c − |+〉t|+〉c)], (12)
where
|+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉), (13)
|−〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉), (14)
h stands for “ home, ” t stands for “ travel, ” and c stands for “ control. ”
(S1) Alice prepares a series (N) of GHZ entangled states in
|ψ1〉n = 1√
2
(|000〉+ |111〉)hntncn, (15)
where n ∈ {0, N}. She takes one photon from each GHZ entangled state, say the photons
t1, t2, t3, t4, etc, and forms a string of photons in a regular sequence, say the ordered string
of photons is t1t2t3t4 · · ·. She sends Bob the ordered photon string (called the T sequence
hereafter). In accordance with the ordering of the travel photons, Alice sends Charlie the
photons c
n
(called the C sequence hereafter) and stores the photons h
n
(called the H sequence
hereafter) by way of two photons as a group, i.e., photons h1 and h2 as group 1, photons h3
and h4 as group 2, etc.
(S2) Bob and Charlie confirm that they have received the travel photons. Also, in a
regular sequence, Bob stores the arrived photons by way of two photons as a group in terms
of their order of arrival: that is, photons t1 and t2 as group 1, photons t3 and t4 as group
2, etc, and Charlie stores the arrived photons by way of two photons as a group in terms of
their order of arrival: that is, photons c1 an c2 as group 1, photons c3 and c4 as group 2,
etc.
5(S3) If Bob wants to transmit messages to Alice, he chooses randomly some photon groups
as encoding-decoding groups (say, group 1 and 2, etc.) for his later two-bit encodings via
local unitary operations U (U1 = Iˆ, U2 = σˆx, U3 = −iσˆy, U4 = σˆz). The remaining photon
groups are taken as checking groups. He publicly tells his choices to Alice and Charlie.
(S4) For each photon in each checking group, Bob randomly chooses one of two sets of
measuring basis (MB), {|0〉, |1〉} or {|+〉, |−〉}, to measure his photons. Then, he publicly
announces the order of the photons, the MB, and the measurement outcomes. Then, Alice
and Charlie perform their measurements, under the same MB as that chosen by Bob, on
the corresponding photons in their checking groups. The intercept-and-resend attack, as
well as the entangle-and-measure attack, can be detected efficiently by this method. If their
measurement outcomes coincide when they use the same basis in the same order according
to Eq. (5)−(12), there are no Eves on the line. In this case, they continue to communication.
Otherwise, they have to discard their transmission and abort the communication.
(S5) Bob asks Charlie to carry out a Hadamard operation on each cn in order. The
Hadamard operation has the form
H|0〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉), (16)
H|1〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉), (17)
which will transform the state shown in Eq. (15) into
|ψ1〉n = 1
2
[(|00〉+ |11〉)hntn ⊗ |0〉cn + (|00〉 − |11〉)hntn ⊗ |1〉cn]. (18)
Charlie measures photon c
n
. If he obtains the outcome |0〉cn, photons (hn , tn) will collapse
into the state
|η+1 〉n =
1
2
(|00〉+ |11〉)hntn ; (19)
otherwise, the state of photons (h
n
, t
n
) will be
|η−1 〉n =
1
2
(|00〉 − |11〉)hntn . (20)
(S6) After the above operations, in accord with the encoding-decoding group ordering,
Charlie informs Alice and Bob of his measurement results via a classical communication.
(S7) In accord with the encoding-decoding groups ordering, Bob performs his two-bit
encodings via local unitary U operations on the encoding-decoding groups according to his
6bit strings (say, 0001· · ·) needing to be transmitted this time: for instance, a U1 operation
on one photon of group 1 to encoding 00, a U2 operation on one photon of group 2 to encode
01, etc. After the unitary U operations, Bob performs the Bell state measurements on all
the encoding-decoding groups.
(S8) Bob publicly announces his Bell measurement result and the encoding-decoding
group’s order for each encoding-decoding group.
(S9) Alice measures her unmeasured photon groups in Bell states after Bob’s public
announcement in (S8). After she knows each of Charlie and Bob’s Bell measurement results
with the group order and her Bell measurement results with group orders, she can identify
the exact unitary U operations performed by Bob on each encoding-decoding group. She can
read the two-bit encodings. For example, we suppose that Charlie’s measurement results
are |0〉c1 and |0〉c2. Then, |ψ1〉1 and |ψ1〉2 are collapsed into the states
|η+1 〉1 =
1
2
(|00〉+ |11〉)h1t1 , (21)
|η+1 〉2 =
1
2
(|00〉+ |11〉)h2t2 . (22)
If Bob performs U1 operation on one photon of group 1, then the state of the whole system
composed of photons (h1, t1; h2, t2) is
U1|η+1 〉1 ⊗ |η+1 〉2 =
1
4
(|00〉+ |11〉)h1t1 ⊗ (|00〉+ |11〉)h2t2
=
1
4
√
2
|ψ+〉t1t2(|01〉+ |10〉)h1h2 +
1
4
√
2
|ψ−〉t1t2(|01〉 − |10〉)h1h2
+
1
4
√
2
|φ+〉t1t2(|00〉+ |11〉)h1h2 +
1
4
√
2
|φ−〉t1t2(|00〉 − |11〉)h1h2
=
1
4
[|ψ+〉t1t2 |ψ+〉h1h2 + |ψ−〉t1t2 |ψ−〉h1h2
+|φ+〉t1t2 |φ+〉h1h2 + |φ−〉t1t2 |φ−〉h1h2]. (23)
If Bob publicly announces his Bell measurement result is |φ+〉t1t2 with a probability of 1/16,
then Alice’s measurement result is |φ+〉h1h2. Thus, she can conclude that Bob performed a
U1 operation on one photon of group 1 and, therefore, extract the bits (00), and she can
read the two-bit encodings (see Table 1). Similarly, in accordance with the photon group’s
ordering, she can obtain the bit string (0001· · ·).
7TABLE I: Corresponding relations among the unitary U operation (i.e., the encoding bits), the
initial states, and Bob’s and Alice’s Bell measurement results (|η±1 〉n = |η±1 〉hntn = 12(|00〉±|11〉)hn tn ,
|µ±1 〉n = |µ±1 〉hntn = 12 (|01〉 ± |10〉)hntn).
U1(00) U2(01) U3(10) U4(11)
|η+1 〉h1t1 ⊗ |η+1 〉h2t2 |µ+1 〉h1t1 ⊗ |η+1 〉h2t2 i|µ−1 〉h1t1 ⊗ |η+1 〉h2t2 |η−1 〉h1t1 ⊗ |η+1 〉h2t2
|φ+〉t1t2 , |φ+〉h1h2 |φ+〉t1t2 , |ψ+〉h1h2 |φ+〉t1t2 , |ψ−〉h1h2 |φ+〉t1t2 , |φ−〉h1h2
|φ−〉t1t2 , |φ−〉h1h2 |φ−〉t1t2 , |ψ−〉h1h2 |φ−〉t1t2 , |ψ+〉h1h2 |φ−〉t1t2 , |φ+〉h1h2
|ψ+〉t1t2 , |ψ+〉h1h2 |ψ+〉t1t2 , |φ+〉h1h2 |ψ+〉t1t2 , |φ−〉h1h2 |ψ+〉t1t2 , |ψ−〉h1h2
|ψ−〉t1t2 , |ψ−〉h1h2 |ψ−〉t1t2 , |φ−〉h1h2 |ψ−〉t1t2 , |φ+〉h1h2 |ψ−〉t1t2 , |ψ+〉h1h2
(S10) Similarly, if Charlie wants secure direct communication with Alice, he can do the
same thing as Bob does.
(S11) The controlled secure direct communication has been successfully completed.
In the present protocol, we use the property of quantum entanglement swapping instead
of the property of quantum entanglement. If the sender (Bob) wants to transmit messages
to the receiver (Alice), Charlie must take an Hadamard operation on each of his photons,
measure it, and tell the results to Bob and Alice in order. When GHZ entangled state is
successfully shared, no qubit has to be exchanged in a quantum channel. This leads to
four important advantages. Firstly, If no eavesdropping is found in the checking procedure,
the secret messages can be transmitted successfully. Because there is not a transmission of
the qubit that carries the secret messages between Alice and Bob in a public channel, it is
completely secure for controlled secure direct communication if a perfect quantum channel is
used. That is, after the checking procedure, there is no longer any chance for Eve to attack
the secret messages. Secondly, the degradation of the entanglement of the photon pair will
not decrease due to the travel of the photon in the H sequence in a real quantum channel.
Thirdly, after insuring the security of the quantum channels, if Charlie would like to help
Alice and Bob to communicate, Alice and Bob can communicate secret messages directly
under the control of the third side Charlie. Only with the help of controller Charlie, the
sender and the receiver can implement secure direct communication successfully. Fourthly,
this protocol can also be generalized to a multi-party control system in which N parties
share a large number of N-particle GHZ entangled states. Party M (M ∈ N) as receiver,
8party Q (Q ∈ N,Q 6=M) as sender, and N − 2 parties, except for party M and party Q, as
controllers. The multi-party controlled secure direct communication can also succeed.
In summary, we have proposed a controlled secure direct communication protocol by us-
ing a large number of GHZ entangled states via entanglement swapping and local unitary
operations. When GHZ entangled state is successful shared, no qubit has to be exchanged
in a quantum channel. Different form Man’s scheme [10], in this protocol, anyone of the
multi-partners can send messages to any receiver secretly with the help of controllers by
using a local operation and a reliable public channel. The result shows that for such a pro-
tocol, can realize successful controlled secure direct communication between two users. Since
the message transferred only by using local operations and public channels after entangle-
ment was successfully distributed, this protocol can protect the communication against the
destroying-travel-qubit-type attack. This scheme can also be generalized to a multi-party
control system.
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